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from their consumption and children, without caring of their adult offspring.
There is a risk that population growth and capital accumulation trigger a
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1. Introduction
This document considers a market economy where firms produce goods
from labor and capital and households save in capital, dictate the number
of their children and spend on health care to improve their survival. The
economy contains the externality that population growth and capital accu-
mulation boost pollution that threatens to trigger a lethal environmental
disaster. Could this externality be eliminated by (linear) taxation? This
research question is examined by a dynamic game where the benevolent gov-
ernment is the leader and the representative household the follower.
For the sake of clarity, the disaster is taken as a random regime shift that
occurs only once, with the post-event regime holding indefinitely. As pointed
out by de Zeeuw and Zemel (2012), this restriction is not essential and models
of recurrent events, where several shifts occur at random times with inde-
pendent intervals, can be analyzed using the same methodology. Because
the construction of different mortality rates for different cohorts would ex-
cessively complicate the analysis, then, following Becker (1981), it is assumed
that the whole population has a uniform mortality rate, for simplicity.
Polasky et al. (2011) analyze how the threat of future regime shift af-
fects the optimal management of natural resources. They focus on harvesting
a renewable resource (e.g., fishery), whose growth rate is dependent on the
regime and whose stock can trigger a regime shift. They show that the possi-
bility of the regime shift makes the central planner precautionary, i.e., willing
to maintain a larger stock of the resource. In this document, the government
faces the risk of disaster due to pollution and behaves in precautionary man-
ner by keeping the damaging stock (pollution) at a lower level.
Many dynamic models of pollution control assume smooth convex damage
functions (e.g., van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992, and Dockner and Long
1993), which ignores the effect of a potential regime shift on the optimal
policy. Then, there is no need for precautionary measures against pollution:
the policy maker should respond at the moment pollution occurs, but not
beforehand. To examine the need for precautionary environmental policy,
de Zeeuw and Zemel (2012) consider the management of a system that is
subject to the risk of an abrupt and random jump in pollution damage. This
document applies the same idea for the management of a market economy
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when pollution-related mortality is the damage.
Haurie and Moresino (2006), Polasky et al. (2011) and de Zeeuw and
Zemel (2012) consider only the central planner that can fully control all re-
sources of the economy. In contrast, this document examines the government
in a market economy where microeconomic agents (households and firms) de-
termine production, fertility and capital accumulation, unintentionally gen-
erating lethal emissions, but the government can use only linear taxes. Public
policy is then constructed as a dynamic Stackelberg game where the govern-
ment is the leader. This approach has the benefit that the suggested policy
rules can be presented directly in terms of observable variables (e.g. prices
and the interest rate).
Tsur and Zemel (2008, 2009) ignore population growth, but examine the
possibility of climate change in a market economy where firms employ la-
bor, capital and two energy inputs that are perfect substitutes: clean input
that does not emit, and dirty input the emissions of which accumulate “haz-
ardous” stock that threatens to trigger the climate change. As a result, they
obtain a Pigouvian tax on the “hazardous” input. In contrast, this document
considers endogenous population growth that may trigger the catastrophe.
In order to avoid excessive complications in the model, the choice of en-
ergy inputs is ignored and it is assumed that population growth and capital
accumulation generate “hazardous” pollution as a by-product.
Harford (1997, 1998) addresses the issue of environmental and population
externality in a dynamic model where the individuals are altruistic toward
their descendants and environmental pollution is a joint product of output.
In his model, the social planner optimizes the utility of the representative
individual. By comparing this optimum with the individuals’ decisions, he
shows that Pareto optimality requires both a pollution tax and a parental
tax per child, because the former does not limit fertility enough to keep
population stationary. To contribute to the discussion on this matter, this
study adds Harford’s parental tax into the potential tools of the government.
Palokangas (2018) and Lehmijoki and Palokangas (2019) examine opti-
mal taxation in an economy where households dictate fertility and save for
capital, while firms produce output from labor and capital, and population
growth and capital accumulation generate pollution. In those studies, how-
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ever, there is no precautionary motive, for the current damage (mortality)
is a smooth function of current pollution. In this document, in contrast,
there is a precautionary motive: pollution triggers the damage (i.e., lethal
environmental disaster) randomly at any moment of time.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic structure of the economy, including the behavior of competitive
firms. Then, a stochastic Stackelberg game is defined, with the government
as the leader and the representative micro-household as the follower. Section
3 considers the household’s and section 4 the government’s behavior. Section
5 presents optimal public policy and section 6 summarizes the results.
2. The economy as a whole
2.1. Population and labor supply
In the model, time t is continuous. Population L grows at the rate that





= f −m, L(0) = L0. (1)
The units are normalized so that one unit of labor is needed to rear one
newborn. Then, labor devoted to child rearing is equal to total fertility fL,
and the remainder of the population, N , works in production:
N
.
= L− fL = (1− f)L ⇔ n .= N/L = 1− f. (2)
2.2. The goods market
In the economy, there is only one good. The depreciation of capital is
included in the production function of that good, so that the accumulation
of capital K is given by dK
dt
. Because (private) capital is the only asset in the




of the good, Y , is used in consumption C, health care H and investment dK
dt
:




It is convenient to define consumption output Y , C, health care H and
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as a control in





= [s+ (f −m)k]L. (6)
2.3. Firms
The firms produce output Y from capital K and labor input N [cf. (2)]
according to neoclassical technology:


























> 0, F linearly homogeneous. (7)
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Noting (2), (4) and (7), output per head, y, can be defined as a function of
capital per head, k, and the fertility rate f as follows:











= −FN(k, n) < 0. (8)
The representative firm maximizes its profit Π by capital input K and
labor input N according to technology (7), given the wage w and the interest















Because the production function F is subject to constant returns to scale
(i.e., linearly homogeneous), then, in equilibrium, the marginal products of
capital and labor, FK and FN , are equal to the interest rate r and the wage
w, respectively, and total profit Π is equal to zero [cf. (8) and (9)]:
y(k, f) = F (k, n) = FBn+ FKk = wn+ rk = (1− f)w + rk,
r = FK(k, n) = yk, w = FN(k, n), yf = −FN(k, n) = −w. (10)
2.4. Externality
It is assumed that aggregate capitalK and aggregate population L pollute
according to the geometric average P = KγL1−γ = kγL, where 0 < γ < 1 is












































With result (11), population L can be replaced by pollution P as a prede-
termined state variable in the model.
The probability of the environmental disaster, π, is assumed to be an
increasing function of pollution P . Then, the disaster can be considered as
a random shock q with mean π(P ) as follows:
q =
{
1 with probability π(P ),
0 with probalility 1− π(P ),
where π′ > 0. (12)
The externality in the economy is the following: the environmental shock
q increases every individual’s mortality rate m simultaneously, but each indi-
vidual can decrease its personal mortality rate m by spending on its personal
health care h with increasing marginal costs. This function is specified by
m = χ(δq − h), χ′ > 0, d
2(−m)
dh2
= χ′′ > 0, (13)
where the constant δ > 0 is the effect of the shock q in terms of output per
head (= in terms of health care per head, h) and
∣∣∣∣dmdh
∣∣∣∣ = −dmdh = χ′ (14)
the marginal efficiency of personal health care h in decreasing the personal
mortality rate m.
The household chooses its saving per head, s = dk
dt
, fertility rate f and
heath care per head, h. Because of the one-to-one correspondence between h
and m through the function (13), then health care h can be replaced by the
mortality rate m as the household’s control in the model, for convenience.
Denoting the inverse function of χ by z(m)
.
= χ−1(m) in (13) yields









The factors affecting the mortality rate m [cf. (13)] affect also the level of
health, `, but in the opposite direction: the environmental shock q worsens
every individual’s health simultaneously, but each individual can improve its
personal health ` by its personal health care h. Because the definition of
health ` as a separate function of q and h would excessively complicate the
analysis, and because it is technically convenient to handle the mortality rate
as the household’s control in the model, health ` and the mortality rate m
are defined as negatively associated joint products of the same process:1
`(m), `′ < 0, `′′ exists. (16)
2.5. Public policy
The government sets a poll tax a ∈ < per head, the tax τ ∈ (−∞, 1) on
capital income rK, the parental tax x ∈ < on the number of children, fL,
and the tax b ∈ (−1,∞) on health care H. If a tax is negative, then it is a
subsidy. Any set of linear taxes that support Pareto optimum in the model
is equivalent to those taxes. The government’s budget is [cf. (4)]:
aL+ xfL+ τrK + bH = 0 ⇔ a+ xf + τrk + bh = 0. (17)
In the model, the setup of public policy is a Stackelberg game as follows.
The representative household is the follower that determines its consump-
tion per head, c, its spending on health care per head, h, and its fertility
rate f , taking the taxes (a, x, τ, b) and the environmental shock q as given.
The benevolent government is the leader that maximizes the representative
household’s utility by the taxes (a, x, τ, b), observing the follower’s behavior,
the behavior of the firms, (10), the budget constraint of its own, (17), and
the risk of the regime shift (12, 15) due to pollution (11). The follower’s and
leader’s behavior are examined in sections 3 and 4.
1The mortality rate m is introduced as a factor of utility through health ` [cf. (18)]
only to ensure that the functions (26) and (42) can be strictly concave with respect to the
mortality rate m for realistic values of consumption per head, c, capital per head, k, and




According to Becker (1981), an individual derives its utility c(t)f(t)α,
where α > 0 is a constant, from its consumption c(t) and the fertility rate
in its household, f(t), at each time t. This study extends that framework
by introducing personal health ` as the third factor of individual utility.
Consequently, noting (16), periodic utility u is a function of consumption





, α > 0, `′ < 0, `′′ exists. (18)
Let ρ be the constant rate of time preference for a hypothetical individual
who could live forever. When an individual faces the mortality rate m, its
probability of dying in a short time dt is equal to mdt. Then, the probability
of its survival beyond the period [ζ, t] is given by em(ζ−t), and its expected
periodic utility at time t ≥ ζ is em(ζ−t)u(t). Consequently, noting (16),
the representative member’s utility for the whole period t ∈ [ζ,∞) in the
household is given by
∫ ∞
ζ
u(t)σe(ρ+m)(ζ−t)dt with (18), 0 < σ < 1, (19)
where σ is a parameter and ρ+m the effective rate of time preference with
mortality. The closer σ is to one, the more eagerly the household transfers




is equal to private saving:
dK
dt
= wN + rK − C − hL− [a+ xf + τrk + bh]L, (20)
where w is the wage, r the interest rate, N labor supply, wN labor income,
rK capital income, C consumption, h spending on health care per head, hL
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total spending on health care and [a + xf + τrk + bh]L tax expenditures
[cf. (17)]. By (4), (6), (8), (15) and (20), consumption per head, c, can be
defined as a function of the household’s controls (s, f,m), capital per head,
k, taxes (a, x, τ, b), the wage w, the interest rate r and the shock q as follows:





wN + rK − C
L
− (1 + b)h− a− xf − τrk
= (1− f)w + rk − c+ (1 + b)[z(m)− δq]− a− xf − τrk ⇔
c = c̃(s, f,m, k, a, x, τ, b, w, r, q)
.
=
w + (m− f + r − τr)k − s+ (1 + b)[z(m)− δq]− (w + x)f − a. (21)
3.3. Transformation from real into virtual time
The mortality rate m can be eliminated from the discount factor of the
utility function (19) by Uzawa’s (1968) transformation:








> 0 hold true, one can
define θ(t) as an alternative time variable and set the variables in terms of it.
Noting (10) and (22), the utility function (19) with (18) and the constraint
s = dk
dt














, k(0) = k0. (24)
3.4. Optimal behavior
The household maximizes its utility (23) by investment per head, s, the
fertility rate f and the mortality rate m subject to its consumption per head,
(21), and its accumulation of wealth per head, (24), given the wage w, the
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interest rate r, the environmental shock q and the taxes (a, x, τ, b). This
defines the value function at initial time ζ as
Φ(k, a, x, τ, b, w, r, q, ζ)
.
= max










Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and noting s = dk
dt
[cf. (5)], the Bellman
equation for the household’s program (25) is constructed as follows:
Φ(k, a, x, τ, b, w, r, q, ζ) = max
(s, f,m) s.t. (21)
Λ(s, f,m, k, a, x, τ, b, w, r, q, ζ) with





















The first-order conditions for maximizing the function (26) by the controls





















































− w − x− k
)
= 0 ⇔ f = αc































When the mortality rate m is held constant, the function Λ is strictly
concave in controls s and f . To obtain a unique equilibrium for the household,
the strict concavity of Λ must be extended for all controls (s, f,m). This is
done by examining the second-order partial derivative of Λ with respect to












[k + (1 + b)z′]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
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+ σ2cσ−1fασ`σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
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If, in this equation, the negative effects of the mortality rate m dominate over
the positive intertemporal effect of the effective discount rate ρ+m and the




< 0 holds true and the function Λ is strictly concave. Furthermore,







Thus, differentiating equation (29) totally yields the mortality function










Results (28) and (30) can be explained as follows. An increase in the
parental tax per child, x, decreases incentives to rear children (i.e., the fer-
tility rate f falls relative to consumption c). When capital per head, k,
increases, it is more difficult for the household to save that capital k for each
newborn. This as well decreases incentives to rear children (i.e. f falls). An
increase in the tax on health care, b, discourages health care, increasing the
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mortality rate m.
The solution of dynamic programming is based on finding a specification
for the value function Φ. Then, one can use Merton’s (1971) rule as follows.
In the steady state s = 0, from the Bellman equation (26) it follows that
(
arg max












Thus, one can try the simplest case where the value function Φ is a positive








Plugging (31) into the Bellman equation (26) in the steady state s = 0 yields
ϑ = 1. (32)

















⇔ ρ+m = ∂c̃
∂k
= m− f + r − τr
⇔ f = (1− τ)r − ρ. (34)
The household’s response functions are the fertility rate relative to consump-
tion, (28), and the fertility rate (34). The government takes these together
with the firm’s responses (10) as constraints in its optimization.
12
4. The government
4.1. Setup for public policy
The definition of pollution, (11), determines the fertility rate f as a func-
tion of the controls (s, v,m) and state variables (k, P ):

































The government balances its budget (17) by the poll tax a. Because there is
one-to-one correspondence from the other taxes (τ, x, b) to (s, v,m) through
the system (21) [with (34)], (35) [with (28)] and (30), investment per head,
s = dk
dt
, the change of pollution, v = dP
dt
, and the mortality rate m can replace
the taxes (τ, x, b) as the government’s controls in the model.
Inserting the production function (10), the government’s budget (17) and
the fertility function (35) into the household’s consumption per head, (21),
it is possible to define consumption per head, c, as a function of the govern-
ment’s controls (s, v,m) and the state variables (k, P ) as follows:
c = ĉ(s, v,m, k, P, q) = c̃ = y(k, f) + (m− f)k − s− δq + z(m), (36)
with the partial derivatives
∂ĉ
∂s
































By (22), the constraint v = dP
dt






, P (0) = P0. (38)
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4.2. Optimization
The government maximizes the representative household’s welfare (23) by
its controls (s, v,m) subject to the occurrence of the environmental shock,
(12), the accumulation of capital per head and aggregate pollution, (24) and
(38), and the determination of the fertility rate and consumption per head,
(35) and (36). Thus, its value function at initial time ζ is defined by













where q = 0 holds true before and q = 1 after the shock. Noting (39), one




Ψ(k, P, 0, ζ)−Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ)
Ψ(k, P, 0, ζ)
. (40)
The following result is proven in the Appendix:
Proposition 1. If the loss of income due to the shock, δ, is small relative
to consumption per head before the shock, c|q=0, (e.g., if δc|q=0 is less than
10%), then the relative damage of the shock in terms of welfare, (40), is
approximately in fixed proportion σ to it, D(k, P, ζ) ≈ σ δ
c|q=0 .
The parameter σ ∈ (0, 1) tells, how willing the households are to save for
future in capital, i.e., 1
1−σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. [cf.
(19)]. If σ is close to zero, then relative damage of the shock is insignificant
in terms of current consumption. The closer σ is to one, the greater the
relative damage D is in terms of current consumption.
At the occurrence of the environmental shock, q jumps permanently from
0 to 1 [cf. (12)], changing welfare (39) from Ψ(k, P, 0, ζ) into Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ).
Thus, by Kamien and Schwartz (1981) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the
Bellman equation for the government’s program is [cf. (12) and (39)]
Ψ = max
(s(ζ), v(ζ),m(ζ)) s.t. (24),(35),(36),(38)
Υ(s, f,m, k, P, q, ζ) with (41)
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(k, P, 1, ζ)s+
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where the fertility rate f and consumption per head, c, are determined by (35)
and (36), π(P ) is the probability of the environmental shock [cf. (12)] and
the difference Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ)−Ψ(k, P, q, ζ) is the immediate change of welfare
due to that shock. Note that the latter term π
[
Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ) − Ψ(k, P, q, ζ)
]
vanishes entirely after the shock when q = 1 holds true.
From the equilibrium condition yf = −w [cf. (10)] and the household’s
first-order condition (28) it follows that
x = αc/f − w − k = αc/f + yf − k. (43)
Noting (35), (37) and (43), the first-order conditions for the maximization











































































































































































































= x+ k + z′. (46)
The function Υ [cf. (42)] is strictly concave in (s, v). To ensure that the
government’s equilibrium is unique, this property is extended by assuming
that the function Υ as well is strictly concave in its arguments (s, f,m).
4.3. Solution
In a steady state with s = v = 0, from the Bellman equation (41) with

















Thus, one can try the simplest case where the value function Ψ is a positive
constant $ times the maximized periodic utility in virtual time:
Ψ(k, P, q, ζ) = $ max




$ > 0, Ψ(k, P, ζ)
.
= Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ), (47)
where Ψ is the value after the disaster when q = 1. Noting (35), (37), (43)
and (47), the partial derivatives of the value function (47) with respect to
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Dividing the Bellman equation (41) and (42) by the value function (47)
























Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ)−Ψ(k, P, q, ζ)
































for q = 1.
(50)
In this study, the steady-state value of a variable is denoted by superscript
( ∗). There are different steady states before (q = 0) and after (q = 1) the












< 1, $|q=1 = 1, (51)
where π∗
.
= π(P ∗|q=0) is the probability of the disaster [cf. (12)], D∗
.
=
D(k∗|q=0, P ∗|q=0, ξ) the relative damage [cf. (40)] and π∗D∗ the expected
relative damage in the steady state before the occurrence of the shock.
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5. Optimal policy
5.1. The parental tax per child
It is assumed that the relative change of pollution, v
P
, is either negative




. Inserting the value function (47)
and its partial derivative (49) into the government’s first-order condition (45)











































⇔ x = 0. (52)
Thus, in contrast to Harford (1997, 1998), the parental tax per child is not
positive in this case:
Proposition 2. The parental tax per child can be eschewed, x = 0.
Because the other taxes eliminate the externality through pollution and mor-
tality, this tax is unnecessary.
5.2. Taxing capital income
Plugging x = 0 [cf. (52)], the profit maximization condition yk = r [cf.
(10)] and the value function (47) into the partial derivative (48) and the








































r +m− f − ρ+m
$
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Because the ratio of the difference between the fertility and mortality rates
to the sum of the rate of time preference and the mortality rate, f−m
ρ+m
, is















Plugging (51), (53) and (54) into the household’s response (34) yields the
optimal tax
τ =


































for q = 0,
0 for q = 1.
This result can be rephrased by the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Before the disaster, the optimal tax on capital income is an








After the disaster, that tax can be eschewed, τ |q=1 = 0.
5.3. Taxing health care
Because optimal public policy leads to the Pareto optimum, where con-
sumption per head, c, the fertility rate f and the mortality rate m are equal
in the household’s and the government’s problems, then, by (26), (32) and
(41), the ratio of the household’s and the government’s value functions, (33)
and (47), is Υ/Λ = Ψ/Φ = $/ϑ = $. From this, (13), (15), (51) and the
comparison of the household’s and the government’s first-order conditions,




= σcσ−1fασ`σ(k + z′)− Υ
ρ+m
19
= σcσ−1fασ`σ(k + z′)− $Λ
ρ+m
























(kχ′ + 1)π∗D∗ > 0 for q = 0,
0 for q = 1.
(55)
Noting (15), the result (55) can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4. Before the disaster, the tax on health care should be in pro-
portion (kχ′ + 1) to the expected relative loss for the disaster π∗D∗,
b|q=0 = (kχ′ + 1)π∗D∗ > 0,
where k is capital per head and χ′ the marginal efficiency of personal health
care h in decreasing the mortality rate m [cf. (14)]. After the disaster, that
tax can be eschewed, b|q=1 = 0.
Because a single household ignores the effect of its health care h on the
other households’ mortality rate m through the increase of population L and
pollution P , its demand for health care exceeds the socially optimal level
before the occurrence of the disaster. Thus, the demand for health care
must be discouraged by the tax b. The more efficiently personal health care
decreases mortality (i.e., the greater χ′), or the more capital k each surviving
person needs, the higher the tax b must be. If health care is very inefficient
in decreasing mortality (i.e., χ′ is close enough to 0), then the tax is roughly
equal to the expected relative loss for the disaster, b ≈ π∗D∗.
6. Conclusions
This study examines the optimal management of a market economy where
(i) households decide on saving, health care and the number of their children,
(ii) the government controls their activity only by linear taxes, and (iii)
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population growth and capital accumulation generate pollution, increasing
the risk of a lethal environmental disaster. In this situation, it turns out that
a rational government should perform the following precautionary policy.
To implement Pareto optimality – i.e., to internalize the external link
from population growth and capital accumulation to welfare though pollution
and mortality – it is necessary to set precautionary taxes (i.e., taxes prior
to the disaster) on capital income and the demand for health care. These
are increasing functions of the expected relative damage of the disaster. The
specific tax rules are given by Propositions 2, 3 and 4. In particular, Harford’s
(1997, 1998) parental tax is wholly unnecessary in this setup. In addition,
only the revenue raising-poll tax is needed.
There are two reasons for this sharp result. First, because there is no
incremental contribution of pollution to the mortality rate, then there is
only the precautionary, but no maintenance motive for the government to
intervene. Second, because the mortality rate can be decreased by spending
on health care, then the mortality shock turns into an increase in the cost of
health care, which has the same effect as an exogenous fall of income.
Appendix: the approximation of the relative damage D
Because, by (35) and (37), the fertility rate f doesn’t, but consumption
per head, c, does depend on the shock q, the partial derivative of the value
function (47) with respect to the shock q is negative:
∂Ψ
∂q














Ψ(k, P, q, ζ) < 0. (56)
Consider now what happens for the value function (47) if q jumps discretely
from 0 to 1. Applying the mean value theorem to (47), and noting (56), one
obtains the following: there exists a value ξ ∈ (0, 1) so that
Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ)−Ψ(k, P, 0, ζ) = ∂Ψ
∂q
(k, P, ξ, ζ) = − σδ
c|q=ξ
Ψ(k, P, ξ, ζ) < 0. (57)
Furthermore, from (37) it follows that c|q=ξ = c|q=0 − δξ. Given this, (47)
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Ψ(k, P, 0, ζ)−Ψ(k, P, 1, ζ)




Ψ(k, P, ξ, ζ)


















































Noting (19), the result (58) leads to the approximation D(k, P, ζ) ≈ σ δ
c|q=0 .
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